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Introduction
According to the NSF, "R&D consists on activities carried on by persons trained, either formally or by experience, in the physical sciences such as chemistry and physics, the biological sciences such as medicine, and engineering and computer science. R&D includes these activities if the purpose is to do one or more of the following things: The NSF also presents a list of activities that must be excluded from the deÞnition of R&D.
Among these we Þnd social science expenditures, deÞned as those "devoted to further understand- There are two elements from this deÞnition that I would like to highlight. First, the Þnal product of the R&D investments are new Þnal, intermediate or capital goods and the effect of R&D on productivity is embodied in these new goods in the sense of Solow [1959] . This means that a Þrm can only beneÞt from R&D by using the goods that result from the R&D activities.
1 Second, there are other intentional non-R&D innovations that lead to improvements in productivity. These non-R&D innovations are disembodied in the sense that, to enjoy the gains in productivity, Þrms do not need to adopt any new capital or intermediate good.
A few examples may illustrate the distinction. The resources Henry Ford devoted to invent the mass production system were not R&D, and neither are McKinsey's reports, the resources devoted to develop better personnel and accounting practices, or any other managerial innovation. 1 Of course, R&D labs could beneÞt from the knowledge created in previous R&D efforts. These R&D externalities are addressed below. What I will not consider is the possibility that Þnal output Þrms beneÞt from the knowledge created in the labs without using the goods that embody it. 2 This distinction is substantive because the degree of embodiment affects the speciÞc mechanisms that prevent
In this paper I focus only on embodied innovations and try to answer the following question:
What is the contribution of R&D to the growth of advanced economies? Is it the main factor or does it play a minor role?
This question has been answered before by computing the social return to R&D in a simple econometric framework. Typically, the endogenous variable is the Solow residual and the explanatory variables are the Þrm's or industry's own R&D intensity and the used R&D from other Þrms or industries. The estimated return to own R&D ranges from .2 to .5, while for the used R&D the estimate ranges from .4 to .8 with a total social return to R&D of about 70 to 100 percent.
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These numbers are very large. Indeed, since the average share of non-defense R&D in GDP over the postwar period has been 1.6 percent, they imply that the Solow residual is fully accounted by R&D alone.
Before accepting this conclusion, we should keep in mind an important caveat to this econometric approach. Namely, that there are many factors omitted in the typical regression that affect simultaneously TFP growth and the parties incentives to invest in R&D. The most obvious candidates are anything that enhances disembodied productivity, like the managerial and organizational practices, learning by doing,... All these elements have a clear effect on TFP and at the same time induce Þrms to invest in R&D. Some evidence in favor of the potential importance of this bias comes from the fact that, after including Þxed effects in the regression, the effect of R&D on TFP growth almost disappears (Jones and Williams [1998] ).
To overcome this omitted variable bias, I depart from the econometric framework. Instead, I
use a model with endogenous development of new technologies to assess the importance of R&D for growth. From a methodological point of view, I do not attempt to calibrate directly the social return to R&D to Þgure out its role on growth. My route is more indirect because it decomposes the problem into two parts. First, I compute the effect of the amount of resources devoted to R&D on the output of the R&D sector (that is the growth rate of R&D driven technologies). Then, I
use simple growth accounting to compute the effect of the growth of technology on productivity growth.
One possible way to establish the Þrst relationship ( i.e. between the resources devoted to R&D and the growth rate of technology) consists in calibrating the production function of technology.
This approach, however, entails probably even more challenges than the traditional productivity the imitation of the innovation and also the size of the externalities in production. 3 See Griliches [1992] , Jones and Williams [1998] and Nadiri [1992] for references.
approach because in addition to measuring the externalities involved in R&D, we have to specify an R&D production function. I discuss this further below in the context of a speciÞc empirical test.
The approach I propose in this paper, instead, exploits the free entry condition into R&D and the fact that R&D innovations are embodied. Free entry implies that, in equilibrium, R&D Þrms break even. As a result, the value of the resources devoted to R&D equals the value of the newly developed technologies. In other words, the relationship between the share of resources devoted to R&D and the growth rate of technology is a linear function of the inverse of the market value of an innovation.
The advantage of using a free entry condition instead of the production function for innovations is that, since innovators are small, they don't take into account the effect of their investment decisions on the aggregate variables when computing the value of an innovation. Therefore, I can use these observable aggregate variables to establish the effect of the R&D investments on the growth rate of technology without having to take any stand on the production function for new technologies.
The results I obtain are quite striking given the existing consensus about the importance of R&D for growth. 4 The average annual growth rate of productivity in the US during the post-war period has been 2.2 percentage points. Less than 3 to 5 tenths of 1 percentage point are due to R&D.
The intuition for this small contribution is quite simple. The few resources devoted to R&D signal a small private value of the innovations. But, as the bulk of the productivity literature has argued, there may be signiÞcant externalities that lead to large productivity gains even with few R&D investments. These externalities can appear in the production of Þnal output or in the R&D process.
Production externalities arise because the development of one innovation has an effect on labor productivity beyond its contribution to the capital stock (i.e. it affects the Solow residual). When innovations are embodied, Þrms enjoy production externalities to the extent that they use the new goods. Further, a larger production externality implies that, for a given number of available innovations, the demand faced by new innovators is higher. Therefore, ceteris paribus, the market value of an innovation is positively correlated with its social value. In terms of my two-step approach, this means that a larger production externality raises the effect of the growth of technology on productivity growth but reduces the growth of technology associated with a given R&D intensity. 4 The only exception to this consensus is the BLS who reports a R&D contribution to Total Factor Productivity growth of 0.2 percentage points. This difference steams from the rate of return for R&D that the BLS imputes which is substantially lower than in the rest of the literature.
As a result, the R&D contribution to productivity growth is not very sensitive to the size of the externalities in production.
R&D externalities associate past R&D investments with a reduction in the cost of developing future innovations. To show the inconsistency of large R&D externalities and a low R&D intensity in steady state, suppose for a moment that the R&D externalities were large and that the economy is in steady state. Then, a small R&D intensity today, can generate a large growth rate of technology that in turn generates a large reduction in the costs of developing innovations tomorrow. As a result, tomorrow, agents want to devote a large share of resources into R&D; but this is inconsistent with the fact that the share of resources devoted to R&D is constant in steady state. Therefore, the observed low R&D intensity indicates that R&D externalities cannot be very large.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 sketches the basic argument. In section 3, I conduct the baseline calibration based on the model presented in Jones and Williams [2000] .
This model is quite general and can accommodate idea-based models both with quality ladders and increasing variety of intermediate inputs. In this section I also discuss the comprehensiveness of the NSF measures of the R&D intensity. One clear goal of this paper is to show that the magnitude of the calibrated R&D contribution to productivity growth is very robust. Section 4 tries to show this by investigating elements that affect the relationship between the share of resources devoted to R&D and the growth rate of technology (for example the presence of increasing returns in the production of R&D driven technologies, international spillovers, ...). I also consider more general production functions that accommodate more ßexible relationships between R&D-driven technology and productivity growth. This analysis emphasizes the importance that R&D innovations are embodied. In this sense, this paper contributes to the literature that started with Phelps [1962] on the relevance of the decomposition between embodied and disembodied technological progress. In section 4.3, I move out of the steady state and consider how the calibrations would change had the US economy been in transition to the steady state. In section 5, I draw the welfare implications of the previous analysis. SpeciÞcally, the free entry condition establishes a relationship between the R&D intensity and the growth rate of technology that can be used to calibrate the size of the R&D externalities. Once this is done, we can solve the social planner's problem. This entails determining how much she would invest in R&D with the calibrated production structure. Then we can compare this socially optimal R&D intensity with the actual intensity and draw the appropriate policy prescriptions.
The resulting picture after this journey is that R&D plays an small role in US productivity growth -deÞnitely much smaller than what we thought -and that the observed R&D intensity may not be as far from the socially optimal intensity as previous work concluded.
The basic argument
Let's denote by A the level of technology associated with R&D investments. In the terminology of Romer [1990] or Grossman and Helpman [1991, ch. 3] , this is the number of capital varieties though I will show later that this framework can accommodate other interpretations. To compute the R&D contribution to productivity growth, I start by investigating the relationship between the amount of resources devoted to R&D (expressed in units of Þnal output, which is the numeraire), R, and the growth rate of technology. Then I use a production function to relate the growth rate of A to the growth rate of labor productivity. Throughout the paper I use ú X to designate the time derivative of variable X, and γ X to denote the growth rate of variable X.
Let P A denote the market price of a Þrm that has earned a patent to produce one of these varieties. The free entry condition implies that innovators make zero proÞts in equilibrium, therefore the cost incurred to develop the patent (R) is equal to the market value of the ßow of new technologies (P A ú A).
The free entry condition can be rewritten as in equation (1), where Y denotes the economy-wide output, s denotes the share of resources devoted to R&D (i.e. s ≡
R Y
).
Successful innovators can charge a markup (η) above the marginal cost of production either because they earn a patent or because they keep secret the blueprint of the innovation. As we shall see, the static operating proÞts earned by an innovator are
To close the Þrst step in the argument, we just have to derive the market price of an innovation.
Suppose for simplicity that patents do not expire and that innovators are not overtaken by new innovators with more sophisticated capital goods. Then the value of an innovation, P A , must satisfy the following asset equation:
where r is the relevant discount factor.
In steady state, all variables grow at constant rates. From equation (1), this implies that
Substituting expressions (4), (2) and (1) into equation (3) and isolating γ A we obtain the following expression for the growth rate of technology in terms of s :
There are two important observations from this expression. First, γ A in expression (5) does not depend directly on the size of the externalities in R&D or on the degree of the diminishing returns to aggregate R&D investments; 5 note that I have not even speciÞed the production function for technologies. This is the case because we have mimicked the calculations made by small innovators that want to Þgure out the market price of their innovations (P A ) and do not take into account the effect of their investment decisions on aggregate variables like the interest rate or the growth rate of output. Since the externalities appear through these aggregate variables, we do not need to calibrate them once we control for γ Y and r. Second, the quantitative result of the paper comes from the fact that γ A is increasing in s. The link between these two variables does not come from a production function for technology; it follows from the positive relationship that the free entry condition (1) deÞnes between the two.
The second step in the computation of the R&D contribution to productivity growth consists in calibrating the effect of the growth rate of R&D driven technology (γ A ) on the growth rate of productivity. For this we need to specify a production function of the form
where Z is the level of disembodied productivity and K and L denote capital and labor respectively.
From here, the contribution of R&D to productivity is
where α is the capital share and α A is the elasticity of Y with respect to A (i.e. the production externality).
It is useful to assign some tentative values to these parameters to make some back to the envelope calculations about the R&D contribution to productivity growth. A conservative value for η is 1. . Moreover, once I introduce a variable size of the production externalities in section 4.1 in the context of embodied innovations, I show that there is a trade off between the effect of γ A on the growth rate of productivity and the effect of s on γ A . This trade off limits the R&D contribution to productivity growth when production externalities (α A ) are large.
Next, I extend this simple example to illustrate the above claims.
Jones and Williams
The baseline model I calibrate is presented in Jones and Williams [2000] . It is a generalization of Romer [1990] and Grossman and Helpman [1991, ch.3] . Final output is produced out of labor and intermediate goods (x it ). In particular, I assume the functional form in equation (6) . This speciÞcation introduces a wedge between the capital share and the elasticity of substitution across different varieties which is equal to αρ.
Standard proÞt maximization implies the following inverse demand curve for intermediate goods 
Intuitively, the higher the ratio of the number of new goods to the number of complementary goods that must be changed to use the new innovation (
), the lower is the limit markup because more incumbents are willing to reduce their prices to prevent adoption. Quite naturally, the limit price is also decreasing in the elasticity of substitution across intermediate goods.
The resulting price for 6 The calibrated effect of R&D on growth is independent of the rate of transformation between Þnal output and intermediate goods. This parameter that here is normalized to 1 just cancels out. 7 A simple example that illustrates this concept is a CD writer. Before the CD writer was developed, we just had a CD reader and a software for this to work. Now with the CD writer, we must modify the CD reader's software to make possible the interaction between the two drives. In this case, ψ = 1 (the software) and ψ N = 1 (the CD writer). 8 If this is not the case, there is no reason to undertake R&D investments.
intermediate goods is p it = ηr t where the markup is the minimum of η m and η L .
Given this pricing behavior, the instantaneous proÞts of an innovator are:
R&D technology
The R&D sector uses Þnal output to produce new designs for intermediate goods. The production of designs considered here captures three interesting elements. First, because of the innovation clusters deÞned above, only a fraction
of the designs corresponds to new varieties. Second, either by randomness or because of patent races, there may be a duplication of R&D effort. This stepping on toes effect is captured by λ ∈ (0, 1] in equation (8) . Finally, there are some spillovers from past innovators to the current ones. On the one hand, new varieties are easier to develop because their designs take advantage of the knowledge created by previous researchers (standing on the shoulders effect). On the other, there may be diminishing technological opportunities that make it harder to develop successive varieties (congestion effect). If the standing on shoulders effect dominates, φ > 0, otherwise φ < 0. From the point of view of the atomistic researchers, there are constant returns to the resources devoted to R&D (R). This means that they perceive a marginal product equal to the average product over all the R&D Þrms. This is represented byδ in equation (8) .
Note that this speciÞcation accommodates both deterministic and stochastic technologies for the production of new varieties. Indeed, equation (8) is isomorphic to a quality ladder model wherẽ δ is interpreted as the probability of being successful and ψ N is the size of the step in a quality ladder modelá la Aghion and Howitt [1992] and Grossman and Helpman [1991, chapter 4] .
Equation (8) can be rewritten as
From the R&D technology (9) it follows that the effect of the intensity of R&D investment (s) on γ A depends on the size of intertemporal spillovers in R&D (φ) and on the degree of diminishing returns in the production of varieties (λ). One way to assess the role of R&D in productivity growth consists in calibrating the effect of s on γ A from (9), and then use the production function (6) to relate γ A and productivity growth. The main problems with this approach are that it is sensitive to the particular functional form assumed in (9) and that it is difficult to assess the magnitudes of λ and φ. 9 Therefore, it is convenient to Þnd an alternative route that avoids the calibration of λ and φ. This shortcut comes from the free entry condition.
Free entry
If innovators are large, they internalize the intertemporal effects of their current R&D investments and the aggregate (static) diminishing returns to R&D. When innovators are small, they take as given the cost of developing a new product and neglect any externality from their investment. In this scenario, free entry brings down the value of innovations to the up front cost of development.
Let's denote by P A the market value of an innovation. Then, the equilibrium level of resources devoted to R&D is given by equation (10).
Since innovations are priced in the market, P A must satisfy an asset equation. This means that any difference between the opportunity cost of an innovation and the sum of its proÞt ßow plus the capital gain must be arbitraged away. More formally, opportunity cost
where r is the interest rate faced by innovators, ú P A is the increase in the market value of the design and ψ ψ N γ A is the expected loss from being replaced by another innovator.
Equation (10) can be rewritten as:
Using equations (7) and (12) we solve for the proÞt rate, and from equation (12), we can derive an expression for the growth rate of P A in steady state.
Plugging this back into (11) we can solve for the growth rate of varieties (γ A ).
14)
Now we can easily solve for the growth rate of productivity and use this expression to Þgure out the contribution of R&D to productivity growth. From the production function,
To solve for γ x , I take advantage of the symmetry of the intermediate goods in production. From the pricing rule and the inverse demand function, it follows then that
In steady state r is constant and therefore
γ A . Plugging this back into (15), we obtain the following expression for the growth rate of productivity:
Contribution of R&D to productivity growth
Before calibrating the R&D contribution to productivity growth it is worthwhile making a few remarks. The speciÞcation of the production function for new technologies does not affect the calibration of the role of R&D on productivity growth. In particular, the size of the intertemporal externalities, φ, and the returns to scale in the production of varieties, λ, do not affect the relationship between s and γ A after controlling for r and γ Y . This is the case because the agents are small and do not internalize the effect of their investment decisions on these aggregate variables.
However, expression (13) restricts the values of φ and λ. To see this, note that in steady state, equation (9) implies that
Therefore, a low γ A implies that neither λ nor φ cannot be very large. In section 5, I take advantage of this observation to compute the socially optimal R&D intensity and explore whether there is room for a more active R&D policy.
A second remark worth making is that, since the focus of this paper is the contribution of R&D to long run productivity growth, we just need that the free entry condition holds on average for the basic argument to go through.
Finally, note also that, since the baseline model is isomorphic to a quality ladder model, the R&D contribution to productivity growth that I compute next is independent of the actual structure of the R&D process.
Quantitative Analysis
To assess the role of R&D in productivity growth we must calibrate seven parameters. costs. These costs consist on both direct and indirect costs. They include not only salaries, but also fringe beneÞts, materials, supplies, and overhead. The R&D costs also include the depreciation of the capital stock employed in R&D activities.
To the extent that these surveys encompass only existing institutions, they will be ignoring the current R&D investments conducted by starting Þrms. For example, the NSF statistics ignore Bill 1 9 5 3 1 9 5 5 1 9 5 7 1 9 5 9 1 9 6 1 1 9 6 3 1 9 6 5 1 9 6 7 1 9 6 9 1 9 7 1 1 9 7 3 1 9 7 5 1 9 7 7 1 9 7 9 1 9 8 1 1 9 8 3 1 9 8 5 1 9 8 7 1 9 8 9 1 9 9 1 1 9 9 3 r is calibrated to the average real stock return in the US post-war period from Mehra and Prescott [1985] . Pakes and Schankerman [1984] provide evidence that this is approximately the private rate 10 Later in this section, I conduct a sensitivity analysis to show that the small R&D contribution to productivity growth is robust to large mismeasurement by the NSF of the R&D intensity. In any case, the productivity literature has used this same data to claim that there is a large contribution of R&D to productivity growth.
of return to R&D once we take into account the obsolescence of patents and the gestation lags that and Norrbin [1993] for the average markup in the economy. The lower values of this interval are slightly higher than the lower bound in Basu [1996] and Norrbin [1993] because I want to calibrate the markup charged by an innovator. This is probably higher than the average markup in the economy because of the monopolistic power conferred by the patent system and because the higher ratio of the up front Þx cost to the marginal cost of production for technological goods than for non-technological goods or services.
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I do not attempt to calibrate
12 To calibrate ρ, I exploit the relationship between these variables and the markup. There are two cases depending on whether the innovator can charge the monopolistic markup or whether she is forced to use the limit pricing rule. . In the post-WWII period, the US productivity has grown at an average annual rate of 0.022. In the Þgure we can see that under monopolistic pricing the contribution of R&D to growth is bounded above by two tenths of one percentage point. That is, R&D cannot account for more than one tenth of the postwar productivity growth under monopolistic pricing of the innovations.
11 As we shall see below, results hold a fortiori if η is calibrated to a higher (probably more realistic) value. 12 This could be done by using data on the average life span of a patent or, when more sophisticated concepts of Þrms are introduced, on the average life span of a Þrm or on the average number of patents held by an innovator. These small contributions are the result of three effects. First, the low R&D intensity observed in steady state implies that the externalities in the R&D process are small. Otherwise, future R&D investments would be very proÞtable and we should observe a large R&D intensity. Second, as we have shown in section 2, the small R&D intensity also implies that the growth rate of A for any given markup must be low. Finally, in this environment where R&D innovations affect productivity through the goods that embody them, the contribution of production externalities to productivity growth is equal to (
For given α and γ A , a lower the elasticity of substitution across the different intermediate goods increases the size of the production externalities. However, both under monopolistic and limit pricing, a reduction in the elasticity of substitution also raises the markup (η). Naturally, this results in a higher P A and, from the free entry condition, in a lower γ A for any given R&D intensity (s). In other words, the embodiment assumption introduces a trade off between the growth rate of R&D-driven technology and the size of the production externalities that bounds the R&D contribution to productivity.
An interesting observation that arises at this point, is that the effect of ψ/ψ N on the R&D contribution to productivity growth depends on the pricing rule. Under monopolistic pricing, the R&D contribution to productivity is decreasing in the ratio ψ ψ N because the value of an innovation (P A ) increases with the ratio 13 and, from free entry, this reduces the growth rate of A consistent with the observed R&D intensity. When innovations' prices are limited by the prices of the previous innovations, the contribution is increasing in ψ/ψ N because, in addition to the previous effect, now ρ decreases in ψ/ψ N , for any given markup, as illustrated in Þgure 3. As we have just argued, the size of the production externalities decreases with the elasticity of substitution across varieties, and therefore it increases in the ratio ψ/ψ N . This effect dominates the effect on P A and, as a result, the R&D contribution to productivity increases with ψ/ψ N .
Before enriching the basic model to incorporate other important aspects of the R&D process and more general production functions, it is interesting to assess the robustness of the computed R&D contribution to productivity to the calibration of the interest rate (r) and the R&D intensity (s) .
In other calibrations not reported here, I have observed that the small R&D contribution to productivity growth is very robust to the parameterization of the interest rate (r). This allows me to extend the results to environments where innovators are credit constrained and therefore the opportunity cost of R&D investments is higher. Figure 5 and 6 display the R&D contribution to productivity growth when s is calibrated in the interval [0.015, 0.03] for six different pairs of (η, ψ/ψ N ) that basically cover all the relevant range for these parameters. We can see that both under monopolistic (Þgure 5) and limit pricing (Þgure 6), the R&D contribution is still quite small (i.e. bounded above by 0.0035). 13 This follows because an innovator that has succeeded in developing a new technological cluster collects revenues from ψ + ψ N goods. At the same time, the probability that future researchers erode his rents in any of these goods is increasing in 
Extensions
Now, I extend the baseline model along several dimensions to show that the size of the R&D contribution to productivity growth is robust. The Þrst extension generalizes the production function to capture more general externalities in the production of Þnal output. The second group of ex-tensions deals with considerations that affect the private value of an innovation. These include the presence of international spillovers in R&D investments, R&D lags, more drastic obsolescence processes and the possibility of successive R&D for incumbent Þrms (i.e. Þrm-level increasing returns to R&D). Then, I relax the assumption that the economy is in steady state and compute the R&D contribution to productivity growth if the US economy had been in transition during the post-war period.
More general production functions 14
In the baseline model, the elasticity of productivity growth with respect to γ A is equal to
, where the Þrst term corresponds to the static externality of A on output and the second to the capital deepening driven by the development of new technologies. One might argue that with a more general production function we could parameterize the externality in production in such a way that R&D generates an arbitrarily large growth rate of productivity.
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In what follows, I show that if R&D technologies are embodied this is not the case. Intuitively, the variable production externality introduces a wedge between the effective level of R&D-driven technology and A. The embodied nature of R&D innovations implies that to beneÞt from them, Þrms must purchase the goods that embody the innovations. If the elasticity of the effective level of R&D technology with respect to A is larger than one, the efficiency of an innovation grows with its vintage. Moreover, a larger the production externality generates a higher effective level of technology embodied in a new good, for a given A, and this, in turn, induces a larger demand and a higher value for the innovations. Hence, when R&D innovations are embodied, the free entry 14 In this analysis I have assumed that the production function of Þnal output is Cobb-Douglas. Basu [1997] ,
Burnside, Eichembaum and Rebelo [1995] and Berndt [1976] among others have shown that a Cobb-Douglas is a good approximation to the US data. Further, in the working paper version of this article (Comin[2002] ) I show that the growth rate of R&D innovations is not very sensitive to the elasticity of substitution between capital and labor. 15 One such production function would be
Note that, in this production function, by increasing σ we can increase the size of the production externality and the R&D contribution to growth. However, note also that in this production function R&D innovations are not embodied.
Firms do not need to buy a single unit of the lattest innovation to beneÞt from the productivity gains associated with this innovation. Both, casual observation and the NSF deÞnition of R&D suggest that this assumption does not seem to capture how R&D innovations enter in production.
condition implies that a higher production externality reduces the growth rate of A associated with a given R&D intensity. This effect introduces a trade off that limits how much productivity growth can be explained by increasing the size of the production externalities.
To see this more formally, consider an environment that is exactly the same as in the baseline model but with the following aggregate production function:
where now the level of R&D-driven technology is a continuous variable and the capital varieties have different efficiencies a i . To introduce some ßexibility on the size of the production externality, I set a i = bi σ−1 , where b is any positive constant that, without loss of generality, I normalize to 1, σ > αρ and i is a technology index. The size of the externality in production is increasing in σ.
When σ > 1, newer innovations are more efficient than older innovations.
The inverse demand for a particular variety i, is
Due to the isoelastic nature of the demand, innovators set a price equal to a constant markup η times the marginal cost of production r. Following the same algebraic steps as in the standard model, we can easily Þnd that when the state of the art technology has index A, the level of output is given by expression (18) and the proÞts for an innovator that developed a variety with index i ≤ A are given by (19) .
16 It can also be shown that
, where χ K is a positive constant; and that
where χ Y is another positive constant andσ =
In this last expression, we can distinguish two effects of σ on the proÞts of an innovator. The higher curvature in the efficiency of capital vintages (σ), the higher the initial level of proÞts, but also the faster Þnal good producers gradually substitute towards the new, more efficient, varieties.
Expression (19) can be rewritten in terms of the vintage of the variety sold by the innovator.
More speciÞcally, let v i be the vintage of the i th variety. In steady state, A grows at the constant rate γ A . Let's suppose that the economy started on the balanced growth path. Then the proÞts at time t of an innovator that developed a vintage v i variety are:
When σ > 1, the innovations embodied in newer varieties are more proÞtable than those embodied in older vintages. The converse is true when σ < 1. Consequently, the market value of an innovation generically varies in the cross-section. Let P At,v denote the price at time t of a vintage v innovation.
From free entry, we know that
Since P Atv is determined in the market, it satisÞes the following differential equation:
It is easy to see that P Atv = P Att e −γ A(
Dividing both sides of equation (22) by P Avt and plugging (20) and this expression for γ P Atv , we can derive expression (23) .
This expression differs from the growth rate of technology in the baseline model (13) in two respects. First, the proÞt rate of innovations increases with σ. Second, a higher σ implies a higher expected capital loss due to the depreciation of the market value of the innovations. The Þrst effect raises the current value of an innovation while the second reduces it. However, in expression (23) it is clear that the Þrst force dominates the second, and the higher is the externality in production (σ) the lower is the growth rate of technology associated with a given R&D intensity. 17 For this you can solve the differential equation (22) plugging in (20) and using the initial condition (21) .
To complete the calculation we just have to derive the growth rate of productivity from expression (18) .
Note that, for a given γ A , the R&D contribution to productivity growth is increasing in σ. However, doing some simple algebra we can check that, after taking into account the effect of σ on γ A , the R&D contribution to productivity growth is decreasing in σ. To assess the quantitative importance of these effects, I plot the R&D contribution for several values of σ and ψ/ψ N when the markup is equal to 1.2, in Þgure 9. From this Þgure, we can see that, if R&D innovations are embodied, the R&D contribution to productivity growth is quite robust to the size of the production externality and it is smaller than two tenths of one percentage point.
This result relates this paper to a literature that has studied the relevance of the distinction between embodied and disembodied productivity growth. The interest in this question started with Phelps [1962] who showed that the elasticity of the steady state level of output with respect to 18 For higher values of the markups the contribution is smaller.
the savings rate does not depend on the composition of technological progress. 19 On the empirical front, Denison [1964] argued that embodied technological change represents a small fraction of productivity growth. Twenty years later, Mc Hugh and Lane [1987] came out with better estimates that controlled for the cyclical variation in the utilization of capital of different vintages and showed that the contribution of the embodied component of productivity growth was substantial. The argument presented in this section has brought the embodiment hypothesis to the core of the analysis. In line with the replies to Phelps [1962] , it has show that the fact that R&D innovations are embodied in new goods is very relevant to calibrate the contribution to labor productivity of R&D investments.
The value of innovations
In the free entry condition, equation (12), we can see that the relationship between the share of resources devoted to R&D and the growth rate of technology is mediated by the value of innovations.
Therefore, in principle, the R&D contribution to growth could be increased by enriching the model with new dimensions of the R&D process that affect the value of innovations. Next, I show that the small contribution is robust to many variations.
International technology ßows
Intermediate goods ßow internationally. The new technologies developed in Japan can be purchased in the US and used in the production of Þnal output. This observation has two implications for the baseline analysis. On the one hand, I should use the R&D investments conducted in the whole world, and not just in the US, to calibrate the R&D intensity. On the other, a US innovator now can sell her innovation to the whole world, and therefore I should take into account the effect of this larger market size on the value of innovations. In terms of our calibration, the Þrst effect implies that now the free entry condition is
where R w represents the R&D in the world. Following the same logic as above, P Aw can be expressed as:
where Y w and s w denote respectively the world level of output and the share of R&D in the world's output.
The second effect implies that the proÞts of a successful innovator are a function of the output of the countries where she can sell her innovations. Since innovations can be sold internationally, the new proÞt ßow from a new variety is:
As before, the value of an innovation is determined in the market and must satisfy an asset equation.
The last term on the right hand side is the same as in the closed economy case. In steady state, equation (25) implies that γ P Aw is equal to γ Y w − γ A . But the interesting action takes place in the proÞt rate. There we can see that the two consequences from the internationalization of the economy exactly cancel out. More speciÞcally,
Intuitively, the international ßow of intermediate goods raises the resources devoted to develop the varieties that are ultimately used in the production of US output. The ßip side of the coin is that US' (and any other country's) innovators can sell their goods to a larger market. Since both forces are proportional to Y w , they cancel out.
20
Plugging this expression into the asset equation (11), we obtain the following growth rate of innovations:
26)
20 This is not the case if international partners engage in R&D but the US innovators cannot export their products.
This scenario, however, seems empirically irrelevant.
This exercise yields some interesting observations. Note that I have not speciÞed any production function for R&D goods. As we have seen above, that is not necessary to calibrate the R&D contribution to productivity growth. In particular, the following general form is perfectly consistent with expression (26):
where c indexes country c, −c the sequence of other countries different from c and the only restriction on (the possibly country speciÞc) function f c is that there are diminishing returns in R c . Note that this function captures all sorts of international spillovers in R&D.
Coming back to the calibration of the R&D contribution to productivity in the presence of international spillovers, it is easy to see that the Þgures obtained cannot be larger than the ones obtained in the previous section. Note from expression (26) that γ A is increasing in s w and decreasing in γ Yw . In the post-war period, the growth rate of output in the OECD has been higher than in the US, and the share of R&D in GDP is higher in the US than in the OECD. Therefore I keep the previous section's results as upper bounds for the R&D contribution to productivity growth.
Subsequent R&D cost advantage
Up to now, a Þrm has been characterized by the set of varieties that form an innovation cluster.
All of these intermediate goods are developed simultaneously and once they become obsolete the Þrm vanishes. However, the evidence tells us that a large fraction of innovations are developed by
Þrms that have already developed some other innovation clusters. This can be due to the fact that the costs of innovation decline with the number of varieties developed (i.e. there is some form of increasing returns to R&D at the Þrm level). If this is the case, innovations are more valuable than what we have computed so far. Investing in R&D not only grants the right to the future revenues from the new innovation cluster but also the option to develop more clusters in the future at a lower cost. To reconcile the higher value of innovations with the observed low s, the free entry condition now dictates a lower growth rate of varieties and a smaller contribution of R&D to productivity growth.
This additional complexity is useful to generalize the argument made above to large Þrms. These internalize part of the positive consequences of their investment decisions. By taking advantage of part of the externalities, the value of the R&D Þrm increases, and the growth rate of varieties induced by a given share of R&D is lower than when Þrms are small. Hence, the benchmark contribution computed above gives an upper bound for the role of R&D in productivity growth when Þrms are allowed to grow.
To show this more formally, let's suppose that an incumbent Þrm j with i > 0 active innovation clusters has the ability to develop up to i new innovation clusters every instant. Let r ij denote the amount of R&D this Þrm conducts for each of the i projects. Success at each of the projects arrives with an independent Poisson rate δ(r ij ,
), where R i and A i denote respectively the total R&D investments and the total number of varieties available in the market from the Þrms with exactly i − 1 active clusters. The only restrictions I impose on δ are that it is increasing and concave in r ij . Let N i−1 be the number of Þrms with exactly i − 1 active technological clusters.
The framework described so far implies that the total number of clusters developed every instant by Þrms with already i − 1 ≥ 0 active technological clusters is
One important modiÞcation introduced with this setup is that the Þrm now internalizes part of the intertemporal consequences of its R&D investments because it is aware that succeeding in developing the next technological cluster increases the chances of developing new clusters in the future. However, for simplicity, I still assume that the number of Þrms in each size group (N i ) is large and therefore that the effects of r ij on R i , and of A ij on A i are negligible. 21 This means
The optimal level of r ij (denoted by r * ) does not depend directly on i, and satisÞes the following Þrst order condition:
From this framework, it follows that
21 This seems to me the most reasonable scenario: one where Þrms internalize the cost advantage of subsequent innovation but do not internalize the aggregate diminishing returns to R&D or the aggregate intertemporal externalities.
where the Þrst equality comes from the production function for R&D (27) , the inequality is a consequence of the concavity of δ on r ij , and the second equality follows from the Þrst order condition (28) . Rewriting this, we observe that incumbent R&D Þrms make positive proÞts on average from successive innovations.
For new R&D Þrms, however, free entry brings down the expected value of a Þrm with exactly one cluster to the cost of developing the Þrst innovation cluster.
As before, we can derive the relationship between s and γ A by pricing the R&D Þrms. The value of a Þrm with exactly i ≥ 1 active clusters satisÞes the following asset equation:
Using the deÞnition of r * and dividing by V i , we obtain:
At this point, we can make a very useful observation. If V i = iV 1 , the RHS of this equation is independent of i. This means that we can Þnd a solution to this system of difference equations by just solving the one for V 1 . Using this shortcut we can reduce the system to:
The free entry condition for new innovators (30) implies that:
where s 1 is the share of R&D conducted by entrants in total output. Since in the steady state γ A 1 , s 1 and
From (30) and (29) it follows that
where the second inequality takes advantage of the fact that V i = iV 1 .
Plugging (32) into the asset equation (31) we obtain the following inequality:
And from here,
o relate this expression with the growth rate of varieties when innovators are small (13) , recall that incumbents make positive proÞts from subsequent R&D. This means that the new term in the numerator is strictly positive and that instead of an equality, now we have an strict inequality. As a result, the γ A implied by s when we allow Þrms to partially internalize the future cost advantages of their current R&D (i.e. when they are large) is lower than when they are small.
Further extensions R&D lags
In reality there is a lag between the outlay of the R&D investment and the beginning of the associated revenue stream. This lag corresponds both to the lag between project inception and conception (the gestation lag), and the time from project completion to commercial application (the application lag). Rapoport [1971] and Wagner [1968] have gathered data on lags for 52 technologies in various manufacturing sectors and have found that these lags range between 1.5 and 2.5 years.
In Comin [2002] I show that introducing these lags in the analysis has a very small effect on the previous calculations. Imitation Another relevant extension consists in relaxing the assumption of perfect enforcement of patents. If imitators can copy the goods developed by the innovators, the value of innovations declines and the free entry condition yields a higher growth rate of A for any given R&D intensity.
Nevertheless, imitation does not affect substantially the R&D contributions to productivity growth computed above. MansÞeld el al. [1981] have information about the probability that an innovation is imitated and about the average cost of imitation. If in addition we recognize that imitations are not more valuable than the original innovations, then we can easily redo our calculations and observe that the R&D contribution to productivity growth is bounded above by 3 to 5 tenths of one percentage points. 22 .
Transition and relation to Jones [2001]
Jones [2001] has argued that the US economy has been in a transition to the steady state during the post-war period. In this section I extend the previous analysis to the transition and relate my
Þndings to Jones [2001] .
When deriving the relationship between s and γ A , I have assumed that the economy is in steady state only to compute the price appreciation of the innovations. Remember that free entry implies 22 Probably, this upper bound overstates the contribution of R&D because some of the imitation expenses are likely to be reported as research and development expenses in the NSF surveys. This would have the effect of reducing s in our calculations, and from the free entry condition, would result in a lower γ A and in a lower contribution to productivity growth.
If the economy is in the transition, then
The asset pricing equation holds at every instant, but now we have to recognize the new expression for the price appreciation of an innovation. This yields the following differential equation for γ A :
Since s is time varying this differential equation does not have a closed form solution. To approximate the average growth rate of A, we can solve this differential equation calibrating s to the average R&D intensity during the transition. Then, the solution to this equation takes the form
For illustrative purposes, suppose that the term (r(v) − γ Y (v) − γ s (v)) is constant. Then this expression is equal to
In the long run (r − γ Y − γ s ) > 0, therefore for a steady state to exist, it is necessary that C = 0. This implies that
In Þgure 1, we can observe an upward trend in s for the post-war period. This positive growth in s, yields a lower γ A in expression (34) than if it had remained constant. 23 Intuitively, a (temporary) upward trend in the share of resources devoted to R&D is due to an expected appreciation in the value of innovations. Therefore the current market price of innovations is higher and, from free entry, the associated growth rate of R&D driven-technology must be lower. 23 From expression (15) , it follows that, when we take into account the transition of the US during the post-war period, the resulting R&D contribution to productivity growth is also lower than if we assume that the US economy is in steady state. (35) where H A is the number of workers in the R&D sector, and both λ and φ are smaller than 1.
Expression ( . It is transparent in this expression that Jones's conclusions follow from the speciÞcation used for the R&D technology and from the calibration of ϑ. Jones calibrates ϑ by estimating a log-linear approximation of (35) where A is imperfectly measured by the total factor productivity (B) as shown in equation (37).
More speciÞcally, Jones estimates the following equation
where
² t is a serially correlated error term.
As Jones points out, the estimation of equation (38) creates as many difficulties as the regressions in the productivity literature. In particular, the estimate of 1 ϑ is likely to be biased for at least two reasons. First, business cycle ßuctuations in R&D expenditures imply that the regressor is endogenous. Second, the measurement error in A (and the potential misspeciÞcation of the R&D production equation) also generate a correlation between the error term (ε t+1 ) and the regressor (log B t ). However, Jones appeals to the possible cointegration between log H At and log B t which imply that the OLS estimate of 1 ϑ is superconsistent (Hamilton [1994] ).
An important practical issue is whether this asymptotic result can be invoked in a Þnite sample application like Jones's. Campbell and Perron [1991] study this question using Monte Carlo analysis and conclude that a useful rule of thumb is that asymptotic results can be exploited in samples of the size encountered in empirical applications when we can reject the null of no cointegration using the asymptotic critical values. The critical value for this statistic at the 5 percent signiÞcance level is -3.42, which is lower than the Dickey-Fuller t-statistic. Therefore we cannot reject the null that there is no cointegration between log H At and log B t . While this statistical tests does not altogether rule out the possibility that log H At and log B t share a common trend, they do suggest that it may be difficult to exploit the asymptotic properties of cointegration systems in samples of the size we currently have in order to 24 I have experimented also with several lag structures in the Þrst differences of the residuals but these were never signiÞcant. The results of the test were always robust to such variations.
calibrate ϑ, and that exploring alternative approaches may be useful. This paper has presented one such alternative which implies a value of ϑ around 0.05 which is lower than the typical calibration in Jones [2001] .
Welfare
So far I have conducted a positive analysis of the contribution of R&D to productivity growth.
However, the previous Þndings can be used to conduct a normative analysis. In particular, we can proceed in the following three steps. First, specify a production function for innovations; second, use the computed growth rate of R&D-driven technology (γ A ) to quantify the size of the externalities in the production of new technologies. Finally, solve the social planner's problem and determine the socially optimal R&D intensity (s * ).
Note that in contrast to the positive analysis, now it is necessary to specify a production function for new technologies, therefore our results will depend on the particular functional form speciÞed.
In this sense, this section just intends to compare our approach to previous ones. To this end, we adopt the R&D technology used by Jones and Williams [2000] which generalizes the innovation technology posed in Stokey [1995] . SpeciÞcally, they assume that
where both λ and φ are bounded above by 1. In steady state,γ A is constant, therefore
Expression (40) 
From section 4.2, we know that, in this context, the growth rate of R&D technology (γ A ) is given by expression (42) where σ = ρσ/ (1 − αρ) .
Expressions (40) and (42) deÞne a relationship between λ and φ for given (η, α, s, r, γ Y , ψ/ψ N , ρ, σ), where these parameters can be calibrated in the decentralized economy. Table 3 summarizes this calibration. Now that we have bounded the R&D technology using actual US data, we can solve the Social planner's problem to determine the optimal R&D intensity (s * ).
Her problem can be formalized as follows: 
After setting up the Hamiltonian and deriving the Þrst order conditions it is easy to see that in steady state, the social planner devotes a share of output s * to R&D investments, and this results in a growth rate γ * A of R&D-driven technology, where the expressions for these two variables are as follows:
To compute s * I just have to calibrate some parameters that I have not quantiÞed yet. These are γ Z , ς, θ. In this model, Z is exogenous. Therefore it is reasonable to assume that γ Z is the same in the decentralized and in the planned economy. The production function implies that in steady state, γ Z = (1 − α) (γ Y − n) −σγ A .
ς and θ determine the consumer preferences. The optimal consumption path for the representative consumer in the decentralized economy must satisfy the following Euler equation.
The growth rate of the labor force in the US in the post-war period (n) has been equal to 0.0144 and the growth rate of consumption per capita (γ c ) has been 0.021. Therefore if we calibrate the discount rate (ς) to 0.04, the Euler equation implies an inverse of the elasticity of intertemporal substitution (θ) between 1 and 2. Figure 11 plots the resulting optimal R&D intensities for several values of σ and for the λ 0 s that yield a φ in the interval [0,1]. The most striking fact from this Þgure is that the optimal R&D intensities are not much higher than the actual ones. This Þnding is robust to alternative parameterizations of θ, ς, σ, and of the parameters that determine γ A .
Kortum [1993] has estimated λ to be between 0.1 and 0.6. Interestingly, for this range of λ, the actual R&D intensity roughly coincides with the intensity that the social planner prescribes. Williams assume that all TFP growth can be explained by R&D-driven investments, this paper allows the free entry condition to determine the magnitude of γ A .
6 Where does this leave us?
Productivity increases because we learn how to use our factors more efficiently. This learning may be a by-product of other activities not directed at increasing the productivity of resources or the result of investment efforts directed towards the improvement of productivity. In this paper I have focused in evaluating the contribution to productivity growth of one of these investments, R&D.
From the free entry condition into R&D and the fact that R&D innovations are embodied in the sense of Solow [1959] , I have shown that R&D is not responsible for a large share of productivity growth in the US. Since the US is the world leader in R&D, this conclusion can be made extensive to the other nations.
Our prior was that R&D is the main source of long run growth. The immediate question that emerges from this analysis is "then, what is the driving force of productivity growth?". This question should be placed at the top of the research agenda.
I would like to stress that the relatively minor contribution of R&D to productivity growth found in this analysis does not imply in any way that other purposeful investments (management, organization, personnel, Þnancial engineering, and many others) directed to improve productivity are not very important. There are indeed two reasons to anticipate an important contribution from these non-R&D investments. First, the size of the expenditures in these other activities is probably one order of magnitude larger than R&D expenditures. Second, since the innovations that result from these investments are disembodied, not patentable and quite easy to imitate, the externalities associated with them are probably much larger.
From a normative perspective, the analysis conducted in this paper implies that the decentralized economy may not be underinvesting in R&D.
